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hina’s ongoing relationship with the African continent has typically been
characterized as a double-edged sword. On one hand, lucrative socio-economic
partnerships promise an African utopia of infrastructural development, economic
self-sufficiency, and a vibrant Sino-African cultural exchange. On the other hand,
though, China’s approach to investment in Africa motivates worries about its facilitation of
economic dependency.1 Even more sinister is the prediction that under such a regime, some
African countries may have to cede political and economic control to China to preserve the
promise of a vibrant economy. These two future scenarios have been variously characterized
by observers as paranoia associated with China’s ‘compassion capitalism’ in Africa and
genuine concern about ‘what the catch is’. What remains clear, however, is that these
ostensibly generous Chinese investments on the continent come with far-reaching
implications.
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A significant facet of this link between China and Africa is migration – Chinese nationals
have had to relocate to Africa to realize China’s dream in the region2. This has created
compelling scenarios for the growing Chinese diaspora dispersed all over the African
continent, and the central goal of this paper is to ascertain whether the presence and
activities of this diaspora in Ghana constitutes a form of neo-imperialism.
This paper will examine societal patterns that are peculiar to shifts in hegemony and ask
whether or not these shifts constitute a new, diaspora-led Chinese imperialism in Ghana. For
this purpose, we will situate our conception of the term ‘diaspora’ to reflect Walker Conor’s
definition: any group of individuals whose livelihoods depend on an existence outside the
homeland3. Such a broad definition is helpful because, in the case of the Chinese diaspora,
this definition acknowledges the diversity in the reasoning behind relocating to Africa. In the
case of Ghana, the diverse range of Chinese migrants includes engineering professionals on
one end of the spectrum and mining laborers on the other. A further merit of Conor’s
definition is that it is adaptable to the potential change in the status of this Chinese diaspora
within the structures of Ghanaian society if our neo-imperialism thesis is proven valid. This
idea of a change in migrant status is inferred from Edward Said's “Reflections on Exile” in
which he asserts that “White [European] settlers in Africa may once have been exiles, but as
pioneers and nation-builders, the label ‘exile’ dropped from them.4” Said’s claim is further
confirmed by an argument advanced by some African scholars that these white settlers
played an integral role in advancing the three phases of imperialism in Africa. The first phase
of European expansion into Africa involved land and mineral resource exploitation starting
in the nineteenth century. The second phase, which started in the twentieth century,
complemented this material exploitation with ideological indoctrination with the purpose of
maintaining neo-colonial ties. The third phase, which according to these scholars is ongoing,
includes non-white settlers and involves a pursuit of free trade ideals by opening up Africa’s
existing economies to global capitalism 5. If we can demonstrate that the Chinese diaspora
facilitates, or has facilitated, any of these three phases of imperialism in Ghana, we would be
confirmed in our neo-imperialism thesis.
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Other than Said’s formulation, Hannah Arendt’s identification of imperialism as the first
manifestation of capitalist political control gives salience to the possibility that if Chinese
economic practices are making Ghana perpetually dependent on Chinese investments, the
country could eventually exert political and cultural dominance on Ghana6. Arendt suggests
that “Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against
national limitations to its economic expansion.7” Arendt’s theory allows us to infer that an
economically disenfranchised Chinese population could be turned into international foot
soldiers of Chinese expansion abroad. Whether the Chinese diaspora in Ghana fits this
characterization is something this paper will have to establish, but Arendt’s proposition at
least presents the possibility for such an inquiry.
For the purposes of this paper, neo-imperialism constitutes a scenario where the
dominant hegemonic discourses in Ghana have been replaced by Chinese socio-cultural,
political, and economic ideals. A reliable way to gauge the existence of this scenario would
be to review the economic and labor relations, educational curriculum, and political
ideologies that shape the relationship between Ghana and China.
In terms of economic and labor relations between the two countries, China had invested
a total of $11.5 billion into the Ghanaian economy by the end of 2019. A majority of its
investments have been in the energy, transport, real estate, and metal industries. Other than
these, China has also made significant investments in agriculture, chemicals, utilities, and
logistics. Jointly considered, these industries represent the backbone of the Ghanaian
economy8.
Starting in 2005, phases of Chinese investment came to be accompanied by waves of
migration into Ghana. The first wave mostly comprised technocrats working on various
developmental projects9. As of 2018, there were 3,082 Chinese workers in Ghana, up from
1,591 in 2009; these numbers mostly represented technocrats from the Guangdong region
of China10. As soon as these technocrats settled in Ghana, they were joined by their family
members. Increasingly, these technocrats started to function as chaperones for Chinese
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businesses seeking to invest in Ghana, and their liaison led to waves of Chinese laborers
relocating to Ghana11.
It is estimated that there are no less than 6,000 Chinese nationals living in Ghana today 12.
Post-2018, the migrants tended to be family members of technocrats already settled in
Ghana or laborers in the construction and mining industries. For this latter group of migrant
laborers, the economic prospects back in China looked grim, and the move to Ghana was
motivated by a desire for a fresh start and a shot at the wealth being generated in Ghana’s
gold mines and infrastructure projects13. On the surface, such aspirations seem harmless and
even laudable. But a closer look at the interactions between Chinese workers and their
Ghanaian counterparts raises concerns about the resurgence of social mechanisms that
European settlers employed to subjugate Ghanaians in the colonial era.
Christine Choy’s 2016 documentary Reorienting Africa: The Chinese in Ghana explores
the workplace dynamic between Chinese and Ghanaian construction workers and provides
insights into the potential power differential between them. In one of the more memorable
scenes from the documentary, a lead Ghanaian engineer expresses worry about the fact that
a Chinese construction company that employed sixty Ghanaian workers and forty Chinese
workers had failed to hire a skilled interpreter to help facilitate effective communication
between the two groups of employees14. The engineer’s remarks suggested that the Chinese
workers were more interested in maintaining a separation between themselves and their
Ghanaian counterparts. The persistence of this separation seemed to foster a power dynamic
between the Chinese and Ghanaian workers. In this power dynamic, the language barrier
emerged as a reason for the Chinese workers to answer strictly to, and work directly with,
their Chinese chain of command rather than collaborate with the Ghanaian lead engineer or
other Ghanaian workers. Moreover, a closer look at the language with which the Chinese
workers addressed their Ghanaian counterparts reveals a lot of pejorative gesturing and
imperative phrasing. Why this is the case is finally reflected in the lead Ghanaian engineer’s
comments that, since the Chinese have the know-how and the money and it is Ghana that
needs these resources to support its growth, the subjugation of Ghanaian workers in the
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workplace through this kind of denigrating and ineffective communication emerges as a
justifiable sacrifice15. In commenting on this situation, New York University professor and
filmmaker Manthia Diawara remarks that the use of language in this setting seemingly
reflects the existence of a dominance hierarchy. Diawara argues that countries that harbor a
superiority complex do not learn the languages of the people they interact with, and the
Chinese were certainly complicit in that regard. Conversely, the Ghanaian workers’
willingness to learn the Chinese language confirms Diawara’s proposition that this
superiority complex requires members of the subordinate group to learn the language of the
superior group16.
In the educational realm, an interesting development has been the establishment of a
Confucius Institute on the University of Ghana’s main campus. Similar to the Alliance
Française, Goethe Institute, and British Council models of the French, German and British
cultural missions, China employs this institution to teach Elementary Chinese, Business
Chinese, Chinese Martial Arts, and Chinese Chopsticks and Tea Culture 17. Reports suggest
that the Confucius Institute also offers private Mandarin lessons all over Ghana’s coastal and
central regions, particularly in areas where Chinese developmental projects are located like
the coastal town of Tema that houses a number of energy infrastructure projects 18. This, I
submit, represents the most official form of Chinese cultural influence. The offerings of the
institute may seem like nurturing of a tolerant and congenial relationship between Ghana
and China, but a closer look at the curricula reveals a more serious motivation. Both
Elementary and Business Chinese curricula emphasize that conversations between the
Chinese and the Ghanaians need to be along strictly economic and work-related lines, and
are thus likely to feature the kind of imperative and potentially denigrating language used
by the Chinese workers on the construction site discussed earlier. This point about strictly
economic and functional relationships between the Chinese and the Ghanaians can be
further clarified by a look at Ghana’s gig economy.
The gig economy in Ghana, particularly around domestic help and security, has been a
great revenue source for Ghanaians looking to supplement their incomes. There is a
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widespread assumption in this industry that Chinese employers tend to pay higher wages 19.
For the affluent Chinese technocrats, a Ghanaian cleaner or security guard fluent in Mandarin
is a great asset. What is problematic, however, is the fact that the fluency of these employees
is often limited to understanding the imperative commands of the employer. As a
consequence, even the simple act of serving tea, which the Confucius Institute teaches,
insinuates a dominance hierarchy between the server and served. As Li Xiousong notes in an
essay on Chinese Tea Culture, “[in the] ancient times, tea-tasting was among the things that
distinguished men of refinement from men of poor taste. One who was not good at tasting
tea was usually despised20.” Moreover, Xiousong notes, these ‘men of poor taste’ tended to
be the ones serving tea to their masters.21 This aspect of Confucius Institute’s literacy
curriculum that emphasizes communication along strictly economic lines, particularly in
Ghana’s domestic help economy, raises concerns about an ulterior motive that seeks to resocialize a class of Ghanaians into subordinate roles relative to their Chinese counterparts.
In domestic political conversations in Ghana, it is highlighted that Ghana possesses
extensive natural resources which the country intends to exploit to facilitate its local
development. In these conversations, China features as an enabler whose role is limited to
providing technical expertise and machinery22. But in reality, China’s status as a
manufacturing giant means it needs a steady supply of raw materials, and it is this incentive
to gain access to raw materials that drives Chinese investments in its relationship with
Ghana. Current export data suggests that Ghana supplies cocoa, precious metals (gold and
manganese), and timber to China23. This in itself is not an exploitative relationship. But it
happens to be the case that whenever Ghana does not submit to Chinese needs, the Chinese
government resorts to punitive economic measures and forces Ghana to do its bidding. These
punitive measures typically benefit the Chinese diaspora and are emblematic of the skewed
nature of the political relationship between the two countries.
The Chinese government’s power to force the Ghanaian government to bend its rules
and favor the Chinese diaspora is apparent in Ghana’s small-scale mining sector. Legalized
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by the Ghanaian government in 1989, small-scale mining was meant to be a source of income
for Ghana’s rural population. The Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 further protected this
privilege by preventing foreigners from purchasing mining land smaller than twenty-five
acres24. This legislation ensured that access to small-scale mining was limited to local
populations. However, in 2013, it came to national attention that Chinese miners, some of
them illegal, had successfully acquired swaths of mining land and started mining operations
in prohibited areas. It also emerged that the chemicals used in these mining operations had
ended up polluting many of the water bodies in that area. When Ghanaian officials reported
the incident to the Chinese embassy, the embassy was quick to censure them because their
actions were seen as a threat to the political relationship between China and Ghana.
Responding to the outrage, the Ghanaian government deported 713 of these illegal miners.
The Chinese government retaliated by imposing visa restrictions on Ghanaian citizens 25. The
China Development Bank went one step further and stalled its disbursement of a $3 billion
infrastructure loan to Ghana26. Of course the Chinese government in this case was
responding to its economic interests and looking after its citizens in Ghana. But does this
need for the Chinese government to cater to its diaspora necessarily entail punishing Ghana
even when members of this diaspora are involved in illegal activities?
A stronger explanation of the Chinese government’s punitive actions against Ghana to
protect its diaspora could emerge from an understanding of the implications of China’s
economic evolution. As confirmed by Wilson Wu, a Chinese engineer who relocated to Africa
to start a business, the climate on the African continent is “like the China of [the seventies
and nineties] when you could open a business and maybe earn a fortune...those kinds of
fortunes are not possible in China today27.” Economic exiles such as Wu are symptomatic of
a phenomenon that unfolded in China as it became an economic superpower: China’s
economic growth denied large swathes of its population a chance to join the middle class,
and forced many of these disenfranchised people to go into economic self-exile and take
refuge in places like Ghana28. Could it be that by taking punitive actions against Ghana, the
Chinese government is guaranteeing the incorporation of these exiled and disenfranchised
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nationals into its globalizing economy through a sort of proxy-state arrangement? It should
be noted that China’s status as a global economic power grants it the possibility of aligning
itself with such an economic agenda. Moreover, China possesses the capability to obscure
this evidently exploitative agenda by alluding to its shared past with Ghana as a developing
nation. Imperialism has taken more obvious forms in the past, from British naval conquests
to slavery, but imperialism reincarnated in the Chinese form could constitute a more sinister
and clandestine form of domination29.
Another story from Reorienting Africa confirms the plausibility of the above logic. Shu
Jingping migrated to Ghana in the 1990s with the hope of selling mobile phones and making
a better life for herself as her economic prospects in China looked grim. After moving to
Ghana, Jingping sensed an opportunity in another industry: on learning that all the paint used
in Chinese developmental projects in Ghana is imported from China, she decided to enter the
paint business. The business turned out to be a success; Jingping became wealthy and
employed two Ghanaian girls. When Jinping was asked about her experiences in Ghana, she
confirmed the widely believed stereotype that blacks [Ghanaians] were viewed as
unintelligent and lazy by their Chinese counterparts. One can observe through this
commentary the kind of shift that Edward Said identified in the case of the early white
settlers in Africa: these white migrants gained positions of power, lost the label of ‘exile’, and
acquired the ability to exert prejudices upon their new subordinates. When the interviewer
asked Jingping why she had so many dogs in her house, she remarked that it was because
she lived in a black neighborhood, implying that they are meant for protection and
confirming the hint of criminality associated with black people30. Jingping’s story is
emblematic of the experiences of the Chinese diaspora in Ghana which includes not just
professionals and their family members but miners and construction workers as well. These
migrants came to Ghana in search of better economic prospects and contributed to the
Ghanaian economy by building restaurants, hospitals, and supermarkets31. However, in many
cases, they also become conduits for China to tighten its political, economic, and cultural grip
on Ghana, warranting concerns about a diaspora-led Chinese imperialism.
An evaluation of labor relations between Ghanaian workers and their Chinese
counterparts in the construction, mining, education, and gig economy sectors suggests
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undertones of discrimination and a desire to subjugate and exploit rather than cooperate
with the Ghanaians. The role of language as a tool for exerting superiority is revealed in the
interactions between the Chinese and the Ghanaians both in the workplace and in the
domestic sphere. On top of this, the Ghanaian government remains beholden to Chinese
economic interests that are fostered by the Chinese diaspora. The Chinese government has
certainly made it clear that its interests are economic. However, without the support of the
Chinese diaspora in Ghana, the Chinese efforts in the country, and in the continent at large,
are unlikely to succeed. It is this crucial role of the diaspora in advancing Chinese interests
that supports our assertion that the Chinese diaspora in Ghana constitutes a burgeoning
form of neo-imperialism.
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